the customers [Anonymous (2003) ] -This is , simply put, because so many banking information , knowledge and transaction capabilities resources are brought into the hands of any such agent anytime and anywhere -Thus cooperation and control/audit modes and roles must be redefined between bank customers, banks and third parties -The major difference with the Internet alone as a change agent is the ubiquity and user access , which together cement networking and diffuse changesMobile banking is also a source of value-addition to customers via personalization of features , in both a "push" mode, and in a "pull/definition " role as customers can request or configure some service features , as seen already in Scandinavia with how user define M-banking alerts and refuse some service offerings "pushed " down on them by some banks -Some banks have chosen to add wireless systems as a strategic sales and support channel (e.g. Nordea, BNP Paribas, Bankinter, etc..) This leads to a basic choice by top bank management: should they promote platforms supporting mobile marketing and consulting, and enhanced mobile services, OR should they allow for and play a role in mobile access to simple e-and M-banking/payment services-The third option, often stated, but not representing a pure business strategy, is to do so called" both; investments and competence build up alone make this very difficultThat first challenge, leads to a larger one discussed in next section.
Mobile operators as banks or vice-versa?
This Section raises some issues to be analyzed by cash flow case data analysis, and /or technology analysis in Sections 6, and Sections 2.3, 3, 4. respectively -The reader asking to see issues alongside formal /data analysis should read those Sections as well. : With an average 35-65 % (culture and also country dependent) of all mobile generic services being prepaid to the operator over periods of several months to their own offices or via a payment agent (not only banks) ,aren't mobile operators short-term deposit banks holding at any time double digit Billions USD ? Going beyond collection of receivables from their own customers alone, to what extent should operators carry out simple payment processing functions traditionally carried out by banks between their customers and between their customers and third parties? For example, for some mobile operators whose ownership include public utility companies, such third parties could be water, power and cable TV billsFurthermore, with mobile operator's capability to handle efficiently and in real-time max.
: Mobile operators as banks
Euro 10-type payments (tickets, parking,..), and their ability in handling bundled service definitions, aren't they micropayment agents [Tewari,O'Mahony (2003) ]? In addition, in terms of cross-subsidization, are these micropayment services paid by the generic or valueadded transport / communication services?
2.2: Banks as MVNO's:
When banks "influence" or take over mobile operators via ownership structures, why shouldn't they become mobile virtual operators to capture the operator's client base and their cash transactions covering mobile communication services, but also for other payments enabled via the same transmission and transactions infrastructure?
A third party (bank subsidiary , transactions payment cooperative ,etc ..) can act as an aggregator ,reducing the payment processing and network traffic generated by small-payment users ,but adding this party reduces revenue and fee sharing between the bank and owner of the transmission infrastructure -In a way , mobile roaming operators can be looked upon as actually payment clearing systems , even if historically even the banking shareholders of e.g.. MACH failed to see this.
2.3: Payment/transactions infrastructures : Very important is the observation that
actually there is not much difference at IT and technology levels, between the customer care and transactions platforms of mobile operators (see Figure 1 ) ,and those of banks (see Figure   2 ) [Pau , 2003 ] ! This fact is the result of the evolutions of both layered communications systems architecture, and of banking software systems architecture, in that mobile networks have evolved much faster than fixed networks. The security levels offered by mobile networks inside the infrastructure are also on par with those in banking software, not the least because of added security hardware gives -This means that: -for a mobile operator to operate also as a payment clearinghouse , is a relatively minor issue , provided the fulfillment systems comply with interbanking data formats , which they even do more and more -for a bank to operate as a mobile virtual operator using a third party's access networks , is also a relatively minor issue if subscriber data are tagged with bank customer file data , which they even are more and more
The slow revolution of credit card/new SIM/ Mobile phone combination
It is important not to ignore present day's simple solutions which create M-Banking services for today's networks ,as they provide a pressure to come to grips with the issues raised in the previous two sections -Let us mention as examples, some facts : -allow and deploy temporarily cross platform solutions with reverse SMS billing (e.g. UK www.Bango.net); reverse SMS billing includes the capability to make sender (or receiver) validate a monetary transaction they initiate or authorize;
-not to be taken on by some providers who believe that they have "the" solution.
5.M-business models implications on payment transactions handled by mobile operators (Personal payments)
For the individual consumer or agent of a product or service (with corresponding fees) other than generic mobile services, the main payment models for individuals are combinations of the following: 1) Deducted from bill: Advertiser pays 2) Deducted from bill: Retailer pays a percentage (comparable to credit cards)
3) Added to bill: Monthly fee added to mobile service bill for access to M-payment services 4) Added to bill: Fee based, similar to SMS charge, per request or transaction 5) Added to or deducted from bill: Revenue from/to individual from community referrals 6) Added to bill; actual cost of product of service bought by mobile channel However, in addition, the transmission of the relevant transaction related information warrants transmission costs determined from tariffs. WAP communication service airtime is so expensive that banks find it, sometimes and some places, difficult to charge M-banking fees of type 4) above. Some suppliers and banks wait till operator's tariffs and prices for data transfers (GPRS, EDGE, 3G) have gone down.
In many cases the equation is simple: between credit card or banking fees on one hand, and the total of transmission costs and of the sum of 1) to 5) on the other hand, which is the cheapest channel for the purchase of that product or service? Obviously higher fees have been charged in the past due to "flash or emotional purchases", but with the wireless terminals penetration their use is not reduced to such purchases any more. Even then, total transaction fees (transport, applications, transactions handling) will have to be competitive with e.g. Telecom , not only aim at economies of scale , but also at fulfilling transactions for a fee on behalf of third parties such as content owners and banks . At the risk of simplifying, not only do these operators lock margins by service retention at communication level, but they earn additional significant margins by reducing the billing infrastructure investments of third parties, thus taking a percentage of the sum of 1) to 4) and/or billing operator fees (see Figure   3 ). Total operational margins to operating expenses plus depreciation are above 80 %. The argument is in this sub-section not about analyzing the "success" of these services from the demand and user point of view ,but in terms of benefits to operators adopting new payment models -
Cases from financial analysis of mobile operators cash flow statements

Objectives and limitations
A sample of publicly listed communications operators with wireless services was taken with spreading over mobile penetration , economic development , countries and currencies , as well as incumbent roles vs. as « pure » plays -The time period covered was from 1998 to 2004 accounting years , although not all data were available for all periods -For incumbents having fixed and other operations as well, mobile operations were taken equal to the ratio of mobile revenues to total revenues -Had to be excluded in a first analysis such operators as Vodafone who do not publish the accounts and data of all the national operators in which they own minority or majority positionsThe sample included : NTT DoCoMo , Singapore Telecom , Orange , Belgacom , Telenor , Nextel Sprint , TDS , Telkom Indonesia , Estonian Telecom . It represents in total more than 70 valid complete annual data sets from the official annual filings with the national securities and exchange commissions-Because of the amount of such data they cannot be reproduced inside this article, but are available to the research community from the annual reports.
Accounting Methodology
The emphasis in the analysis was on Net operating cash flow (NOCF) and its components, and on Free cash flow, together with subscriber, subscription type, employee, CAPEX (capital expenditure for infrastructure and services), and national discount rate data (from the National The working assumption is that a mobile operator running a conservative financing strategy and a positive NOCF , should be able for its operations only (ignoring investing activities and financing activities) to operate on zero short term debt and get interest income (at , as an approximation , the prevailing national discount rate) from the NOCF -It is then possible to determine the "NOCF margin" from such interest income from the NOCF , in proportion to total revenues -As NOCF is not made operator segment specific in operator accounts ,it was not possible to determine that "NOCF margin" from mobile operations only , although it is most likely that it is higher than for all the communication services of a mixed service operator-The "NOCF margin" approximates the margin all short term lending/borrowing bank operations would generate in a short term deposit bank.
As it turns out that the shared of postpaid mobile revenues to prepaid mobile revenues across the operators and periods, runs at about 53 %, this situation is comparable to a short term deposit/lending bank where the short term loan portofolio aggregates to 106 % of the short term money deposits -This means that in average the operators have cash operations where the leverage is low and could still be extended-"Free cash flow margin" on short term lending/borrowing in a short term deposit bank, after new investments (other than CAPEX and staff operations)-
Results and interpretation
The analysis produces in average over the operators and the years, the following indicators: It should be noted also that the issue spills over to payment terminals standardization; Captin, a project aiming in a first phase to standardise payment terminal to acquirer protocols (www.captin.org) is very much aware that M-payments will face identical problems of interoperability, unless players address the issues 1)-3) above from the start and create a sufficient volume of users / subscribers using one interoperable standard. Content provider bill collection system (e.g. Minitel/iMode) (very many content channels)
